The foreign indebtedness of the Third World has been increasing rapidly over the past ten years. The volume of private and public borrowings expanded between the end of 1970 and the end of 1979 from $ 64 bn to $ 376 bn 1, This development has quickened the interest in methods for an assessment of the external debt situation of developing countries. Interested parties -commercial banks, international organizations, etc., and the borrowers themselves -are looking for criteria by reference to which they can monitor foreign indebtedness and ascertain in good time whether and when the foreign debt of a country is in danger of reaching "critical" dimensions. What view should be taken of the various criteria?
I
n connection with the assessment of the external debt situation of developing countries great attention is still being paid to "classical" single indicators which may be compared with certain traditional rules for the financing of business enterprises and are, like these, without a real rationale. One of these is the debt service ratio (interest and amortization in per cent of export earnings) for which "critical" values are fixed more or less arbitrarily. Yardsticks of this kind are however occasioning wide-spread misgivings; their limited evidential value -not to say inaptness -has been exposed in the literature 2 and is not really questioned in practice. A number of attempts have therefore been made in recent times to evolve through empirical studies indicator systems which get away from the practice of looking at individual criteria in isolation.
Indicator systems of this kind are designed mainly as "early warning systems". The aim is to identify and combine critical data combinations relating to the selected basket of indicators so as to recognize crises of indebtedness early enough to leave time for action * HWWA-Institut f/Jr Wirtschaftsforschung-Hamburg.
INTERECONOMICS, November/December 1980 to forestall critical situations. The identification of critical data combinations presupposes however the possibility of ascertaining stable functional relationships between the probability of a default and the level of certain sectoral or overall economic aggregates.
Selection of Indicators
The attempts to design indicator systems are based on a number of predominantly theoretically-oriented studies trying to analyse and systematize types and causes of debt problems and to affiliate, as far as possible, characteristic statistical time series with particular sets of problems 3. In this way it is hoped to create the prerequisites for the description and interpretation of debt problems. Among the studies pointing in this direction are for instance those by Frank and Cline (1971 ) 4, Dhonte (1975 ) 5 and Feder and Just (1977 5. The aim is to identify especially relevant indicator combinations and/ or eliminate factors of no demonstrable significance by statistical-econometric methods (multivariate procedures). These studies produce index functions in which the assumedly significant factors appear as independent variables. Critical values or critical areas are determined for these functions.
While indicator trend projections are indispensable when these indicator systems are used for prognosticating debt crises, Petersen in the design of his early warning system 7 tries to avoid this detour. His aim is to forecast future debt problems by a direct route, i. e. by drawing on already available statistical data. He must therefore work with relatively long timelags for his indicators as any prognostication of debt crises has to be based on data some of which relate to times one or several years before the date of the forecast.
Common to all empirical studies which are directly or indirectly aimed at designing indicator systems is, in principle, the approach of trying to discover indicators which have revealed significant differences between countries with and without debt problems in the past. In order to illustrate this approach, Petersen's system is dealt with in somewhat greater detail here and then briefly contrasted with the findings of Feder/Just and Frank/Cline. Petersen's early warning system has been selected because it is derived from the most comprehensive 
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"indicator catalogue". Besides, Petersen's method alone is designed for immediate application. Moreover, it seems to meet with interest in banking practice, not least probably because of its relatively simple design. It does without sophisticated statistical methods but produces apparently nevertheless relatively good prognostic results.
Petersen's Early Warning System
Petersen originally included 41 different potential indicators in his inquiry -35 indicators which the OECD had suggested to outline various sets of problems and six others which have been discussed by Dhonte in his study. Lack of statistical data ruled out 16 of the OECD indicators. For the 25 remaining indicators Petersen was able to assemble fairly complete time-series from the beginning of the sixties until 1973. He did this for five countries which had to submit to multilateral debt rearrangements on one or more occasions in the period under review and for a comparable group of 20 developing countries whose debts were not rescheduled. Petersen next examined the mean indicators of the two groups for any significant deviations at dates three to five years prior to the debt rearrangements. The choice of a three-tofive-year antecedent period was purely pragmatic. It represents the minimum time-lag needed to enable an early warning system to be designed. The comparison of the series showed that none of the indicators regularly revealed higher or lower figures for the countries with rescheduled debts than the average of the control group -a result which is not particularly surprising. Petersen however noted a group of 12 indicators which signified differences at least relatively frequently.
The further elaboration of Petersen's early warning system was by and large intuitive. He varied the indicator combinations and thresholds and checked their relevance by a process of trial and error, simply comparing the data obtained in ex-post forecasts. His criterion was correct prognostication of the maximum number of debt rearrangements actually carried out in the countries under review and a minimum of debt rearrangements not subsequently effected. The outcome was an indicator system comprising the following seven indicators and ten critical values (two critical thresholds were fixed for each of three indicators).
The assessment is based on moving three-year averages. The indebtedness of a country is judged to be critical if at least four of the indicators rise above or fall below the thresholds.
